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Finding balance
- STATE OF FLUX
KATHMANDU, FEB 08 -
The concept paper on State Restructuring, recently submitted to the Constituent Assembly (CA), has stirred up and brought out into the open latent fears regarding the radical changes to the Nepali state and society that the provisions in the concept paper will bring. There is, first, fear that granting ethnic and regional groups agradhikar (extraordinary rights) where they are dominant will give rise to ethnic chauvinism and curtail the rights of other groups resident in the same area. In its crudest form, the argument put forward — by some members of the Nepali Congress, in particular — holds that granting any special rights to particular groups is an attack on the basic principles of democracy. In fact, it is stated, this would lead to a kind of dictatorship of one ethnic/regional group over others.
This pristine vision of liberal democracy where the rights of the individual reign supreme is easy to dismiss. After all, there is now recognition worldwide that in highly heterogeneous and divided societies, various measures of affirmative action and the recognition of group rights are necessary if democratic practice is to truly allow for equal opportunity and unleash the social and productive capacities of the people. Mere emphasis on individual rights can, in fact, only lead to the expansion of power of the already dominant group and the further dispossession of the already marginalised. This was clearly seen during the practice of multi-party democracy during the 1990s. As is well known, whereas the representation of Janajatis and Dalits actually declined in the national legislature following the removal of the Panchayat system, the presence of Bahuns and Chhetris increased.
Now, to look more closely at a controversial provision in the concept paper that states “priority” should be given to the dominant community in each federal province when it comes to the selection of “the chief leadership level” for the first two terms of office. This clause in the concept paper is taken to mean that during the terms of the first two provincial governments, in Limbuwan state, for instance, only a Limbu can become chief executive of the province. Some of those who oppose this clause may do so in the fear that dominant groups may lose power. However, there is a genuine fear here that other minority groups in the provinces — some of which may be greatly marginalised — will lose even what little chance they have for political representation and will have to follow the dictate of the dominant group.
This provision, however, should not be looked at in isolation. It should be viewed in balance with the provisions in the concept paper that grant sub-regional autonomy — through the establishment of autonomous, protected and special areas within provinces to protect the rights of the highly marginalised. The question should be: Given a situation where the dominant group in the province has special rights, are the provisions for sub-regional autonomy sufficient to safeguard the interests of the minorities? As the concept paper stands now, the provisions for autonomous, protected and special areas do not appear to allow for adequate safeguards as they come almost entirely under the jurisdiction of the provincial legislature and executive. In order to strengthen these areas, they need to be granted greater rights of appeal to the centre if it is felt that the provincial legislature is acting against their interests.
Further, the provision that the “chief leadership” of the federal states will have to come from its dominant community has to be looked at in relation to the methods that will be adopted to elect the entire provincial legislature and executive. This has been a matter that political parties are still grappling with and have yet to reach a compromise on. It is obvious that the dominance of one group in the legislature cannot be allowed. Most likely, measures for election to the provincial parliaments will be based on a quota system based on the proportional distribution of communities in the state. The question that the political class has to address here is: How can we devise a system of representation for the legislature and other state organs so that minorities will have enough power to ensure that the dominant group will not be excessively so, even in a situation where the latter will be granted some special rights.
Another major fear regarding the demarcation of Nepal into federal states concerns the economic and geographic viability of the provinces as currently envisaged. Indeed, the articulate and thoughtful Nepali Congress member of the State Restructuring Committee Narahari Acharya has stated that while sufficient attention was paid to the recognition of identity, not enough was paid to the question whether the provinces would be economically and administratively feasible. Granted, this is a complex issue and much effort is yet required on this count. Here, then, the formation of a State Restructuring Commission constituted of technical experts may be desirable.
However, this will be futile if this is done along the lines envisaged by certain leaders of the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML, who, through the formation of such a commission, wish to separate the issue of federal demarcation entirely from politics and make it purely technical. It is not difficult to see that underlying this demand is deep ambivalence regarding the granting of any kind of autonomy to historically marginalised groups. The hope is that by focusing entirely on issues of economic and administrative viability, attention will be deflected from the potent political demands for recognition and representation. So that in the end, the restructuring of the state will not be too radical; will not in fact be very different from the administrative demarcations of territory that prevailed during the past half-century. This was clearly the hope when Nepali Congress leader Ram Sharan Mahat stated recently that the Panchayati delineation into 14 zones is much more progressive and practical than the option of 14 provinces as adopted by the State Restructuring Committee.
A technicised State Restructuring Commission would provoke a backlash from various politically mobilised groups. Perhaps the best option then is to institute a Commission or sub-committee that, as suggested by Narahari Acharya, would fall under the direct jurisdiction of the CA. This would enable political actors to closely work with the technical body so that the requisite political and technical aspects will both be addressed.
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