'Engage Maoists so that they don’t take up arms'

Christophe Jaffrelot is Research director at The Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), the largest governmental research organisation in France. Jaffrelot has conducted extensive studies on Hindu nationalism in India and has recently co-edited the book ‘Armed militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists’ with Lauren Gayer. Amish Raj Mulmi met him on the sidelines of Jaipur Literary Festival, which concluded on Feb. 25, and sought his views on federalism, ethnicity and the peace process in Nepal.

Is a federal system the best option for Nepal?

Jaffrelot: If you look at South Asia, India is the only country that has been successful in implementing federalism. The federalism that India has practiced is ethnic, linguistic federalism. Though the recently formed states such as Jharkhand and Uttaranchal were not made on linguistic basis, they were even more ethnic as they were based on tribal identities. Telengana will be of a similar kind. India has defused centrifugal forces by creating new states along ethnic lines, and that has made the Indian Union stable without resorting to favouritism. On the contrary, it has defused favouritism. So if Nepal divides the country with this accommodative attitude, it has everything to win.

The other scenario is Sri Lanka: You alienate groups which become armed militias, and you have achieved war. Fortunately, Nepal is not in that scenario, but Nepal needs to think about it.

Do you think that a federal India is more successful because it is a large state, and that smaller states risk further fragmentation?

Jaffrelot: I don’t think size makes a difference. You have very small federal states in Europe, such as Switzerland and Belgium. It’s not the size that matters so much; it’s the strength of the sub-identity movements that matters more.

Of course, a big state is much more likely to be federal. But you cannot rule out federalism even in a small state.

Is there a model that can assure equal rights for the religious and other minorities?

Jaffrelot: If you give too much concession, you may put national integration into jeopardy. To belong to different religions is really to belong to different cultures. So if you go too far, you may put the nation-building process in jeopardy.

If you can have a uniform civil code that transcends all the communities, and acknowledges the differences in the communities at the same time, I think you find a good compromise.

The lack of a uniform civil code is a real problem for India. That would be my recommendation to Nepal: to start with a code that gives some uniformity to citizenship. But you cannot ignore the different identities that religions are giving to the people. You cannot have schools that teach the way of one community.

How do you think Dalit rights will be asserted in Nepal?

Jaffrelot: India is a good example to look at Dalit rights, though not for Muslims. You may be able to emulate the reservation system, which has been successful. India has been able to create a small Dalit elite. Adivasis, for example, have not been able to benefit from reservations the same way that Dalits have.

For the Dalits of Nepal, reservation could lead to minority rights of people suffering from social discrimination. For the religious minorities, India is not a good model, as it has not done much for them.

How do you see the Nepali peace process?

Jaffrelot: It seems to be stuck. You have to re-launch the process. At the worst, it (the peace process) could be forgotten for good. The Maoists may take up arms again. So we are really in a very ambivalent position.

Do you think the scenario of Maoists taking up arms again is possible?

Jaffrelot: If they are cornered, what else can they do? You have to find a way to engage them. It has as much to do with the Indo-Chinese equation because, obviously, one of the issues was that the Maoists were not as pro-India as the king was. India was not happy at all. So you have to think again about this, about how you can maintain the Sino-Indian equation palatable to all. But in domestic terms, you have to engage the Maoists in such a way that they do not take up arms again. The making of a new government should be the priority. The Maoists have to be in the government.

Why is that necessary?

Jaffrelot: Because if you are outside the government, you do not share the responsibilities. You can be irresponsible. And it’s too early — such a young, new state cannot have an opposition in such an irresponsible mood. You have to build the nation together; it’s a new chapter in the history of the country.

The Maoists have to be in the government also for their disarmament. If you have to integrate the militias in the institutions of the new state, and if they are not involved at the top level, why should they give up arms? Why should they join the national army if they are not a part of the nation-building process?

But there are many voices against integration too.

Jaffrelot: Yes, that’s a problem. That’s where you need to prove statesmanship. You need to put your sense of the state above these kinds of considerations. You have to try, you have to open up, and you have to take risks. Integrating Maoists into the Army is not as risky as keeping them out. Everybody has to make some concessions.

So are the Maoists more trouble outside the government than as a part of it?

Jaffrelot: If you can, before making a national government, set up a programme that is agreeable to everybody, compromise; and count out everything — the proximity to India included, if you do not want to alienate India by being too close to China — and find a middle way, then you will have consolidated and made progress (in the peace process). Else, you will have derailed the peace process. Think of Pakistan — it took 10 years to draft its constitution. Between 1947 and 1958, they tried and failed, and the army took over.

So, the stakes are so high that you must engage the Maoists, reach a compromise, set up a special programme, and start it together.

Should a new constitution be the highest priority?

Jaffrelot: Definitely, because then you will have the rules of the game. And if you make the rules together, those will be shared rules.

But in the face of recent ethnic assertions that are separated from the Maoists, do you think negotiating with the Maoists is the only solution?

Jaffrelot: We started with federalism. One can also weaken the Maoists by dealing with the various (ethnic) groups and giving them some form of autonomy. If you give the ethnic groups the autonomy they ask for, they will be on your side. They will be part of the state-building process. And it will also make things much easier to talk to the Maoists.

Are you saying that the ball is in older parliamentary parties’ court now?

Jaffrelot: They are the ones who have to take the initiative. If they wait and wait and wait, nothing good will happen per se by sui generis. So they have to take the initiative. The Army should also take initiative. They can’t just wait for things to improve by themselves.

A deeper polarisation between the parties is dangerous. But what can the Maoists do? They will not say we will do this or that. The state government must tell them, we want you back. If there is a deal we can make, let’s talk about it. Polarisation is not good. You cannot eradicate the Maoists militarily. If you want to do it, you may need the help of the Indian Army, and that would be a mess. That would be a total mess.

The immediate need is to talk, and to start a debate on what kind of constitution people want. Some middle ground can be found.

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